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“Dira” is a novel experimental paradigm to record combinations of behavioral
and metacognitive measures for the creative process. This task allows assessing
chronological and chronometric aspects of the creative process directly and without a
detour through creative products or proxy phenomena. In a study with 124 participants
we show that (a) people spend more time attending to selected vs. rejected potential
solutions, (b) there is a clear connection between behavioral patterns and self-reported
measures, (c) the reported intensity of Eureka experiences is a function of interaction
time with potential solutions, and (d) experiences of emerging solutions can happen
immediately after engaging with a problem, before participants explore all potential
solutions. The conducted study exemplifies how “Dira” can be used as an instrument
to narrow down the moment when solutions emerge. We conclude that the “Dira”
experiment is paving the way to study the process, as opposed to the product, of creative
problem solving.
Keywords: creative problem solving, divergent thinking, convergent thinking, behavioral experimental paradigm,
chronometric temporal measures, insight, chronology
1. INTRODUCTION
Creativity (Runco and Acar, 2012), innovation (Amabile, 1988), and problem solving (Newell
and Simon, 1972) have shaped human history, culture, and technology. Valued by today’s society
for their contributions to education, recruiting, and employment (Cropley, 2016) they are also
likely to play an essential role in our future society. Moreover, creativity, innovation, and problem
solving are required to address the increasingly complex problems we are facing. A commonality
between these phenomena is the aim of identifying novel and useful answers to more or less
well-defined and ill-defined questions (Simon, 1973; Weisberg, 2006). Based on observations and
reports from eminent scientists such as Helmholtz and Poincaré, Wallas (1926) famously suggested
that the process of generating answers or creative products consists of several consecutive phases.
Since then the exact structure and number of these stages are being debated (Amabile, 1983;
Finke, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 2009; Amabile and Pratt, 2016), but arguably, the moment when
a solution emerges lies at the heart of the matter. This “illumination” phase often follows and
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precedes other stages (Howard et al., 2008): Before finding the
solution, the problem solver needs to “prepare” for the problem
at hand, for example by understanding the question, potentially
within the larger context. If people do not solve the problem
in this phase, they might enter a stage of “incubation.” In
this stage, they are thought to unconsciously keep processing
the problem while they consciously attend to other tasks. The
feeling of manifesting associations or fringe consciousness coined
as “intimation” is the next stage in this model (Sadler-Smith,
2015). Following this, the problem solvers experience a phase
of “illumination” when they suddenly have an idea that answers
the question. Afterwards, during the “verification” stage, this
solution is tested. Certain models consider additional stages
to communicate and implement a found solution as part of
the process. Csikszentmihalyi (2009), for example, calls it the
“elaboration” stage. To sum up, within existing case studies
of creativity, innovation, and problem solving and the theories
behind them, the moment when solutions emerge is part of
a longer “creative process.” However, most studies focused on
the outcome of these three phenomena, without considering the
various processes behind them.
Previous studies identify the moment when solutions
emerge through a range of different phenomena (Kounios
and Beeman, 2014), for example restructuring the problem
representation (Knoblich et al., 1999; Fleck and Weisberg,
2004), an alteration of mood (Baas et al., 2008; Subramaniam
et al., 2009), and the suddenness of changes (Topolinski and
Reber, 2010a). Reports of these potentially associated phenomena
have been used as markers of “insights,” “Aha! moments,” and
“Eureka experiences.” However, some of these phenomena might
only be weak proxies. Danek et al. (2016) have shown that
not every solved problem relies on restructuring. In a follow-
up study, Danek and Wiley (2017) revealed that not every
experience of insight results in a solved problem. Even if a link
between observed phenomenon and “Eureka experience” is well
established as for the mood change, the chronology or even
causality remains unclear: Does insight increase mood (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012), does a stimulated positive
mood cause “Aha! moments” (Isen et al., 1987; Ritter and
Ferguson, 2017), or are they both results of another process?
Therefore, there is a need to detect emerging solutions directly
and not via proxy phenomena. Moreover, most studies on insight
assume Eureka experiences are dichotomous, “Aha! moments”
either suddenly happen or not (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003;
Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Hedne
et al., 2016). Possibly the phenomenon benefits from a more
differential view, theoretically and empirically.
In this paper, we introduce “Dira” as a novel experimental
paradigm to narrow down the moments of emerging solutions
within the creative process. In each of the forty “Dira” tasks,
participants are asked to find a solution. A solution is the
image they consider to correspond best with a one-line text.
On a computer display, the on-screen text and images appear
blurred by default and can only be seen clearly when the mouse
hovers above them (see Figure 1). Tracing the mouse movement
and the hover time on each image allows to measure the time
participants spend processing an image during task execution
and before they report a solution. After each task participants
provide metacognitive self-reports, such as the intensity of their
Eureka experience that accompanies emerging solutions (Cushen
and Wiley, 2012; Danek et al., 2014). We hypothesize that
the combination of behavioral measures of the process and
self-reports can be used to identify distinctive behaviors when
solutions emerge and localize the solutions’ emergence in time.
Further, we hypothesize that feedback on the participants’ choice
moderates the behavior and the reported Eureka experience
thereafter.
2. RATIONALE
In this section, we summarize existing tasks that have been used
to observe themoment solutions emerge during creative problem
solving and we provide an argument for a novel experimental
paradigm. We describe the origin of “Dira” and how we acquired
the problems participants are asked to solve. Finally, we argue
for the mouse-tracking method to trace people’s problem solving
process.
2.1. Existing Tasks Related to Emerging
Solutions
Different types of tasks have traditionally been associated
with the creative process and emerging solutions, namely
insight tasks, divergent thinking tasks, and convergent thinking
tasks.
From a historical perspective, insight tasks (Maier, 1930;
Duncker, 1963; Gardner, 1978; MacGregor et al., 2001) are
the oldest of these types of tasks. They predate the distinction
between divergent and convergent production as introduced
by Guilford (1967) and were consequently developed without
a direct reference to one of these processes. These insight
tasks often take the form of riddles or visual puzzles and
are built around the assumption that the task itself requires
restructuring (Knoblich et al., 1999; Fleck and Weisberg, 2004).
The overlap between insight tasks and convergent thinking tasks
seem particularly strong: for example, Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2003) argue, that convergent thinking problems like the Remote
Associate Task share properties with insight tasks. Nevertheless,
convergent thinking tasks can either be solved via insight or
without. Similarly, classical insight problems are often thought
to converge to a single solution, even though examples for the
nine-dot problem show that more than one solution is possible
(Maier, 1930; Sarcone, 2014). Furthermore, and as Bowden et al.
(2005) and Danek et al. (2016) demonstrate, finding solutions
to insight tasks does not require insight or an Aha experience.
While timing has been discussed since the earliest studies on
insight tasks, often it only relates to the time when a solution
is found. These type of tasks are not repeatable and allow only
between-subject comparisons. Even more, having solved similar
problems in the past seems to influence the process (Lung and
Dominowski, 1985), and it is difficult to identify the similarity
between problems as well as to control for previous exposure.
Consequently, the classic insight problems are not considered for
this study.
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FIGURE 1 | Example of the screen during a “quiz” (Left), all elements unblurred (Center), and the color coded positions (Right). The center and right subfigure show
an example mouse movement. The mouse positions at onset and offset times t1 to t7 are recorded as raw data. The figure on the right shows assigned symbolic
names and colors for each position “a”–“f” and “story” (text) as used in later plots. The text was initially inspired by the image with the white circle, because in
“image c” the shadow reveals the true intention of the figures in the foreground. The black circle marks an example of a “chosen solution”. Dixit images by Libellud.
Divergent thinking tasks (Torrance, 1966; Guilford, 1967;
Runco et al., 2016), in which people are asked to generate several
potential solutions to a question, are associated with individual
creative processes. Nevertheless, the measurement of originality
is usually assessed within the cohort of the experiment and not
for an isolated individual. Consider a “Brick Uses” task (Wilson
et al., 1954; Guilford, 1967, p. 143) in which participants are
asked for alternative uses of a brick. An answer to use the
brick’s pigments to paint might be unique within an experiment,
but the participant might just have reported an instance from
memory (Gilhooly et al., 2007; Hass, 2017). Hence this solution,
although original within the experiment, did not require creative
problem solving from this particular individual. Furthermore,
before assessing the originality, raters decide if answers are
considered for the scoring. For the answer “to paint” in a “Brick
Uses” task, which is similar to the previous example, some would
consider it an “impossible answer” and consequently remove the
answer before scoring originality. Time measurements are often
provided by a minimum or maximum task time and through
fluency measures, and recently the moments of the production
of a solution have received more attention (Forthmann et al.,
2017). Divergent thinking tasks are in general repeatable, but the
difficulty in scoring, and the unknown origin of the solution,
either from memory or as a novel product, disqualify these types
of tasks for our purpose.
Finally, Convergent thinking tasks (Mednick, 1962; Knoblich
et al., 1999; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003), require
participants to come up with a single solution. These tasks
are based on the difficulty to search a large problem space,
produce interim solutions, and verify these results. Some of
these tasks, such as the Compound Remote Associates test,
were developed to specifically address the shortcomings of
the classical insight tasks (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003).
Convergent thinking tasks typically provide a large number
of stimuli for repeated measures. For word-based convergent
thinking problems, language fluency affects the ability to solve
the problem (Hommel et al., 2011).
In our study, we intended to observe behavior during the
creative process, but for problems with three verbal stimuli such
as the Compound Remote Associate task, prospective problem
solvers might not exhibit much observable behavior. The low
number of word-based stimuli within a single task (typically
three) are easy to memorize, and participants can operate entirely
on their working memory. There is little incentive to reread the
words or exhibit other behavioral cues through which the internal
thought process could be traced. The timing of the solution
and the success within a given time are central measurements
in this type of task. For example, Salvi et al. (2016) ask their
participants to press a button as soon as they found a solution.
This timing relates only to the whole process but does not
allow the identification of the involved sub-stages. Therefore
we decided not to use convergent thinking tasks to trace the
emerging solution within the creative problem solving process.
2.2. Development of “Dira”
“Dira” has been developed out of the necessity to collect
fine-grained measurements of the creative process. As an
experimental paradigm to observe the moment when solutions
emerge, “Dira” needs to address one fundamental requirement:
the solution should not be known from the beginning. In this
sense, a solution could either be the answer itself or an algorithm
how to arrive at the answer. If either was known at the moment
the task was given, “Dira” would merely provide measures related
to other processes, for example processing fluency and memory
retrieval.
“Dira” is inspired by “Dixit,” a commercially available and
internationally acclaimed card game. The word “Dixit” is Latin
for “he or she said,” chosen by the French developers of the
game, supposedly to highlight the story-telling aspect. We use the
French word “Dira” for “he or she will point out” as a reference
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to the process throughout the task as well as the origin of the
inspiring game. The 84 unique images of a “Dixit” card deck are
described as “artwork”1 and “dreamlike”2 and have previously
been used in teaching a foreign language (Cimermanová, 2014),
in research on imaginative design narratives (Berger and Pain,
2017), and observing conformity and trust between humans and
robots (Salomons et al., 2018). The cards have also inspired
interventions to foster creativity (Liapis et al., 2015), and are
suggested as “an additional source of inspiration” (Wetzel et al.,
2017, p. 206) for an ideation method.
The task “Dira” we developed uses elements and data from
the game “Dixit.” Therefore, we briefly introduce some relevant
aspects of the game. Three to six players can participate in
the “Dixit” game, which is played in several rounds. At the
beginning of a round, one of the players is appointed as the
storyteller. From the deck of 84 unique cards with beautifully
drawn images, each player receives six cards in their hand. Based
on the drawing on one of the cards, the storyteller invents a
short text and tells it to the other players. Related to this text, all
other players select one card from their hand. The selected cards
are shuﬄed and played on the table. Now all players except the
storyteller have to guess which of the images originally inspired
the text. Based on their choice, the storyteller and all other players
receive points. Hereby the scoring system penalizes storyteller
that produce descriptive texts and associations that are easy to
find. Furthermore it encourages the others to play cards with a
similar non-obvious connection to the text. Moreover, and based
on the different associations the players formed, each image has
some connection to the text. At the end of a round, a group of
players has produced a combination of a short text and as many
associated images as there are players. Nevertheless, and as the
example in Figure 1 illustrates, it would defy the purpose of the
game if the other players would immediately understand any of
these connections.
In each “Dira” task we ask people to find a connection
between a short text and one of six images sampled from past
“Dixit” games with six players. As argued before, people are
unlikely to identify the image that inspired the text immediately.
Instead, they might find a connection between the text and one
of the six potential solutions through controlled processes in
creative cognition (Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2013) or
unconscious associations (Mednick, 1962; Kenett et al., 2014). In
the first case, participants generate several metaphors or potential
solutions from available information and select one of them as the
best fit at a specific time. In the second case, existing associations
are mediated through similarities of common elements before
one of them is identified as the best match. In both cases,
the solution emerges at a distinct moment before participants
select one image by a mouse click. Participants in the “Dira”
task are forced to make a choice, but which of the six possible
solutions they choose depends on their prior knowledge and their
subjective understanding of the task at hand. These differences
1Dixit publisher’s website http://en.libellud.com/games/dixit, last access: 2018-02-
23.
2Wikipedia: Dixit (card game) https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dixit_
(card_game)&oldid=823435686, last access: 2018-04-05.
in problem difficulty are described for other problems as well.
Often, the correctness of a task solution is considered vital to the
measures and consequently needs to be controlled for, as Öllinger
et al. (2014) demonstrate for a well know 9-dot problem. “Dira”
does not have one objectively correct solution and we are not
interested in the exact timing of finding the subjectively correct
solution. Instead, we assess the behavior during the process
through the interaction times with text and images.
For the developed task we assume that two differentmodalities
for the stimuli are advantageous to isolate remote conceptual
associations. If the two stimuli that were to be matched used
the same modality, matches could be found for aspects of these
stimuli that are outside the interest of this study. For example
matches between two visual stimuli could not only be based on
the depicted content, but also on colors, forms, and dynamics
of the image. For two verbal stimuli the constructing syllables,
cultural connotations, and language fluency of the problem solver
would play a decisive role in the selection of an answer. By asking
people to match content from different modalities, we hope to
circumvent the issues above.
2.3. Dataset
The experience of an emerging solution relies on the inherent
quality of the task; in the case of “Dira” on the text as well as on
each of the potentially associated images. Instead of constructing
a synthetic dataset, we crowdsourced the combination of a
single text and six accompanying images from a community of
experienced “Dixit” players. Usually, the card game “Dixit” is
played locally around a table. For groups not sharing the same
space, Boite-a-jeux3 provides an online gaming platform to play
this game across distances and with other players of a similar
skill level. In August 2014 we accessed the publicly available
recorded game data of 115,213 rounds of “Dixit.” We filtered
this initial dataset for English rounds with six players. After
stopword removal (such as “the,” “is,” “at”) and word stemming,
we removed the rounds with stories containing the most frequent
words from the 90th percentile. Looking at the text and images,
candidate sets for the “Dira” task were selected from the
remaining 1,000 rounds of recorded “Dixit” games. The authors
of this paper, two of which are experienced “Dixit” players, chose
40 combinations of text and images. Afterwards, we identified
between one and three contexts of associated knowledge to
control for participants’ domain-specific knowledge in a later
analysis. For example, the sentence “Standing on the shoulders
of giants” is meaningful in different domains like the scientific
community exposed to life and work of Newton, but also for fans
of the Britpop group “Oasis,” who released an album with the
same name. The identified contexts were then grouped into the
following eight clusters (with the number of associated stories in
brackets): Literature (8), music (6), film (7), science (7), popular
culture (12), and high culture (7) as well as word games (11), and
literal interpretations of visual cues (10). These contexts allow
to control for required knowledge to solve the tasks. Finally,
the order of the tasks within the “Dira” experiment was initially
3http://boiteajeux.net; last access 2017-11-15.
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chosen at random but kept the same throughout all conditions
reported in this paper.
2.4. Mouse-Tracking as Process-Tracing
“Dira” is based on the fundamental assumption that
psychological processes can be traced through observable
behavior (Skinner, 1984). Of particular interest to the emerging
solutions is the participants’ behavior during the task when
they are engaged in a creative problem solving process. At the
beginning of each task, participants do not know the text or the
images. To solve the problem, they have to acquire information
from these elements and find associations between the text and
the images. For “Dira” the process of information acquisition is
related to the order and timing of interactions with each of the
elements on the “quiz” screen. Different methods are commonly
used to trace these chronology and chronometric measures of
processes, for example through verbal protocols (Newell and
Simon, 1972), eye-tracking (Thomas and Lleras, 2007), and
mouse-tracking (Freeman and Ambady, 2010).
Verbal and think-aloud protocols have been used in
insight tasks (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004), divergent thinking
tasks (Gilhooly et al., 2007), convergent thinking tasks (Cranford
and Moss, 2012), and also in real-world problem solving (Newell
and Simon, 1972; Kozbelt et al., 2015). While Schooler et al.
(1993) identified an overshadowing effect for insight problem
solving, Gilhooly et al. (2007) did not find any effect on fluency
and novelty production in a divergent thinking task. In a meta-
study, Fox et al. (2011) did not see an effect of verbalization
on the results of tasks, but they noted an increase in the time
required. These results suggest that think-aloud protocols might
or might not change the solutions provided for a task, but they
most certainly change the process.With our interest in narrowing
down the time of emerging solutions within a process, verbal
protocols seemed too invasive and were disregarded.
In a direct comparison between eye-tracking and mouse-
tracking, Lohse and Johnson (1996, p. 37) conclude that mouse
interactions “predispose people to use a more systematic search
and process more information than they normally would.”
Similar to the technique described by Ullrich et al. (2003),
elements in the “quiz” of “Dira” that are not directly under
the mouse pointer are blurred. These indistinct images prevent
participants from accessing this information without moving
the mouse pointer to an element. A notable difference to the
method developed by Ullrich et al. (2003) is that elements in
“Dira” do not fade over time; elements are visible for the whole
time the mouse pointer hovers over them. Uncovered images
imply that information acquisition and information processing is
possible throughout the whole hover time. Indeed, participants
will not necessarily direct their full attention to the currently
unblurred text or image. While this appears as a disadvantage
of mouse-tracking, Ferreira et al. (2008) have observed the same
issue for eye-tracking. People are also known to not always
perceive visual input when generating ideas (Walcher et al.,
2017). Furthermore, other processes such as memory access are
related to eye movements as well (Johansson and Johansson,
2013; Scholz et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Freeman and Ambady
(2010) have shown that mouse-tracking provides reliable insight
intomental processes andwhile it providesmore robustmeasures
than eye-tracking, it is also easier to administer. Mouse-tracking
was chosen as the process-tracing method for the “Dira” task,
also because it allows running several studies in parallel in a non-
invasive setup using standard hardware participants are familiar
with.
3. METHODS
3.1. Experimental Design and Conditions
The computer-based experiment “Dira” is programmed as a
series of different screens. From the participants’ perspective,
“Dira” combines perceived freedom to explore the task with
aesthetically pleasant stimuli. Participants interact with the text
and images of the task by hovering the mouse pointer over these
elements. The order and duration of these interactions are up
to the prospective problem solvers. The images are taken from
the “Dixit” card game which has been praised for its artistic and
beautiful drawings. Moreover, the whole experiment is designed
like a game. These design choices are intended to make the
“Dira” tasks “inherently interesting or enjoyable,” one of the
critical elements that are known to increase intrinsic motivation
in participants (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p. 55). In turn, Baas
et al. (2008) and da Costa et al. (2015) have shown positive
correlations between intrinsic motivation and performance in
creative problem solving tasks.
For the current study, “Dira” was administered in three
different between-subject conditions. In condition 1 “Dira” does
not provide any feedback and participants have no reference
to evaluate their answers and performance in the task. In
condition 2 we added a potential solution to trigger extrinsic
insights. Given that tasks are often perceived as difficult, this
demonstrates a possible solution to the participants and hence
is thought to increase the motivation to solve the next problem.
Furthermore, these solutions have the potential of triggering
extrinsic insights, which are a special type of insight following the
recent argument by Rothmaler et al. (2017). Given the correlation
between mood and insight (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012) a triggered Eureka experience
could have a positive effect on the intrinsic motivation and
metacognition. In condition 2 we want to explore if this leads
to a change in the reported experience and observed behavior.
In condition 3 we ask participants to elaborate on their reported
solution. We expect this verbalization of an answer to increase
the metacognitive awareness during task execution (Hedne et al.,
2016) and hence an effect on “quiz time” and reported Eureka
experience. Condition 1 was the first to be run and all participants
at the time followed the same protocol. Subsequent participants
at a later time were randomly assigned to either condition 2 or
condition 3.
In condition 2 the additional screen “explanation” is added
to each round as illustrated in Figure 2. Appended after the
“rating,” it is the last screen before the start of the next round. The
“explanation” screen shows the “intended solution,” the image
that initially inspired the storyteller to invent the text. We also
show a short explanation on how the intended solution and text
are connected. The short sentence is based on a text taken from
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental conditions of the “Dira” rounds. Each parallelogram represents a screen and the annotation in the right upper corner identifies in which
condition the screens are used.
the stimulus dataset and is designed to help the participants: One
method to solve a “Dira” task is to empathize with the storyteller
and find the intended solution that initially inspired the text. To
assess the success of this help, we then ask the participants to
rate “How much does the Explanation help [you] to understand
the association between image and text?” Their answer ranges
from “not at all” to “very much” on a seven-point Likert item.
Submitting the answer starts the next round of condition 2 with
a “fixation cross.”
In condition 3 an “elaboration” screen is placed between the
“rating” and the “explanation” screen as shown in Figure 2. In
this screen, participants see the given text and their selected
image, and they are asked to elaborate on their decision.
Afterwards, they see the same “explanation” screen as described
above. Once they have completed these additional screens,
participants restart the next “round” of condition 3 with a
“fixation cross.”
3.2. Procedure
Any “Dira” experiment starts with an opening sequence
consisting of a “welcome” screen, a “questionnaire,” and a
“description” of the task. This initial series is followed by
40 rounds containing a “fixation cross,” “quiz,” “rating,” and
optional “explanation” or “elaboration” screens. The experiment
concludes with an on-screen “debrief.”
A “welcome” screen explains the basic idea of the study as well
as potential risks and the right to withdraw data. The study only
continues if participants understand and agree to the minimum
requirements that have been cleared by the Faculty of Health
and Human Sciences Ethics Committee at Plymouth University.
Once participants have given their consent, they are shown the
“questionnaire.”
During the “questionnaire” participants are asked to specify
their age, gender and primary language and if they have
participated in the study “Dira” before. They are also asked to rate
their fluency in understanding written English and familiarity
with the card game “Dixit” on a seven-point Likert item.
Participants are also asked to rate themselves in 14 additional
seven-point Likert item questions, four of which belong to the
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) developed by Lyubomirsky and
Lepper (1999) and ten more of the Curiosity and Exploration
Inventory II (CEI-II) as published by Kashdan et al. (2009).
The scales were chosen because emotional states (Baas et al.,
2008), openness to experience, and intrinsic motivation (Eccles
and Wigfield, 2002) are known to influence problem solving
(Beaty et al., 2014). These results are not discussed here since the
interaction between individual differences and the performance
in the “Dira” task are beyond the scope of the current article.
Once participants have completed the questionnaire, the
procedure of the experiment is explained to them in detail in
a “description” screen. This screen also holds a minimal and
neo-Gestalt inspired definition of the “Eureka moment” as
“the common human experience of suddenly understanding
a previously incomprehensible problem or concept,” for
accessibility reasons taken from Wikipedia (2016). Afterwards,
the 40 “rounds” of the experiment begin.
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of hovering times on elements during the “quiz.” The modes of the bimodal distribution are marked with red lines. The cutoff time between the
two distributions, a result of the classification described in the text, is shown in blue.
Each “round” starts with a “fixation cross” which is shown at
the center of the screen for a randomized time between 750 and
1,250ms. Afterwards text and images appear on the “quiz” screen
as illustrated in Figure 1: one text on top and six images in a grid
of two rows by three columns. Unless the participants hover the
mouse on top of these elements, the letters of the text are shown
in a randomized order, and the images are strongly blurred. An
example can be seen in the second screen of Figure 2 which
shows the text “Don’t judge a book by its cover” with the letters
in a randomized order and images blurred except for “image f”
over which the mouse pointer hovers. The recording of hover
times during the “quiz” allows to track when participants pay
attention to each of the elements and for how long (Navalpakkam
and Churchill, 2012). On this screen, participants attempt to find
the image that they think is most likely associated with the text
and select it through a single click. There is no time limit for
completing this task. Once participants have chosen a solution,
they advance to the “rating” screen.
During the “rating” screen, participants are asked to rate their
performance in the “quiz.” They are asked the following four
questions, with the range of possible responses on seven-point
Likert items in brackets: “How confident are you that the solution
is right?” (not confident—very confident), “How hard was it
for you to come up with the solution?” (not hard—very hard),
“How strong did you experience a Eureka moment?” (not at all—
very strong), and “How happy are you with your answer?” (very
unhappy—very happy). After submitting the answers, the next
round starts with a “fixation cross.”
Participants who have completed the 40 rounds conclude their
participation with the “debrief” screen. Here they are informed
that the study intended to measure the timing of their behavior
during the “quiz.” Participants are encouraged to give additional
feedback concerning the experiment, and they have the option
to leave an email address in case they want to be informed of
the results of the study. This on-screen debrief was followed
by a short unstructured personal discussion relating to their
experience in the Dira experiment.
3.3. Task Administration
The controlled study “Dira” was designed as a computer-based
task administered in a laboratory setup. The task was delivered
through a custom developed web application delivered through
a full-screen web browser. The same type of computer mouse
with an optical sensor and the same type of 22 inch LCD screen
with 1,920× 1,080 pixel resolution were used for the whole
experiment. Participants are most likely familiar with the setup as
it is the same hardware available to students in library and public
computing spaces across campus. The experiment was delivered
in a dedicated room with no more than five participants at the
same time who were asked to stay silent during the experiment.
Welcome and debrief was performed outside the room to keep
any distraction to a minimum. Informed consent was collected
from participants; then they were accommodated at a computer
showing a “welcome” screen.
3.4. Participants
One hundred and twenty-four participants between the age of
18 and 56 (age = 22.6, sd = 6.99) were recruited from a local
pool of pre-registered psychology students and a second pool that
was open to students of other courses and members of the public.
While two of the participants chose not to report their gender, 83
identified as female and 39 as male. Psychology students received
course credits and points for running their studies. Participants
from the second pool received monetary compensation. The
overall sample appears similar to the one described by Henrich
et al. (2010).
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FIGURE 4 | One participant’s interaction with text and images during the first 10 s (x-axis) of each of the 40 rounds (y-axis). The length of each colored bar notifies the
duration, the color identifies the position of the element. Horizontal black lines mark the items that are selected in this round, the vertical black lines mark the end of
the “First Full Scan.” The numbers between one and seven next to the y-axis show the reported strength of the Eureka experience for that round. The green blocks
mark rounds that are kept for further analysis. For details see text.
3.5. Data Pre-processing
The data collected during the “quiz” of the “Dira” task are
intended to trace the participants’ thought process through
their behavior. The recorded dataset includes chronological
information concerning the order in which participants engage
with elements, as well as the duration of the interactions.
The chronology or order in which participants engage with
elements shows that they do not interact with all elements in each
round. If participants do not look at the text, this has implications
on their ability to solve the problem: Participants who have not
seen the text will not be able to find an association between the
text and one of the images for this particular round. On the other
hand, if they have seen the text but not all images, they are still
able to find a solution. Rounds in which participants did not look
at the text were therefore excluded from further analysis, whereas
rounds with missing interactions for some images were still
analyzed. Furthermore, cognitive processes deployed in rounds
that start with the text might differ from the ones starting with
one of the images. To control for these different modalities, we
focus in this paper on the rounds starting with text and remove
all others.
The duration of interactions with text and images is assumed
to relate to the amount of acquired and processed information.
However, the data also include quick movements that do not
contribute to acquiring information, as illustrated in Figure 3. If
people want to look at an element not adjacent to the current
mouse position, they need to move the pointer across one or
more elements. In this case, the distance of the mouse pointer
from the target image is between 1.5 times and 4.3 times the
size of the target. According to Fitts’ law, the task of moving
to a distant image has an index of difficulty between 1.3 and
2.4. Applying the extreme values for throughput suggested in
Soukoreff and MacKenzie (2004), participants are estimated to
require between 260 and 640ms for the whole distance and
therefore between 150 and 170ms to cross an image between the
starting position and the target image. During this movement,
the element is briefly unblurred on screen. Figure 4 shows
examples of this movement at the beginning of rounds 4–7. The
density of the duration of interactions in Figure 3 shows how
often participants interact with elements for certain durations.
The bimodal distribution suggests that there are at least two
different types of behavior recorded. Shorter interactions, in
Figure 3marked as the local maxima around 44ms, are distinctly
different from longer hover times peaking around 437ms. A
cluster model fitted to the log-transformed duration using two
components (Scrucca et al., 2016) classifies 17,849 interactions
as short and 63,452 as long, divided at 130ms. The predicted
movement time according to Fitts’ law and the identified time
dividing the bimodal distribution of hover times suggest that the
shorter engagements with elements might be movements across
the element, targeting another one. If participants follow the
mouse movement and see the intermediately unblurred image on
screen during the shorter engagement, the following unblurred
target image acts as a backward mask. Previous research does not
provide evidence for perceptual discrimination between visual
stimuli shown for less than 100 ms (VanRullen and Thorpe,
2001; Zoefel and VanRullen, 2017). Furthermore, Salti et al.
(2015) argue for a required exposure of more than 250ms
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necessary to consciously perceive a stimulus. Assuming that
specific information from a higher conceptual level is required to
identify remote associations in the “Dira” task, these activations
would require additional time, as Quiroga et al. (2008) have
shown in single neuron recordings. For the “Dira” experiment
we are interested in interactions for which participants can
distinguish between different images. Concluding the different
cited streams of research we assume that shorter interactions
from the bimodal distribution shown in Figure 3 have no or
little influence on the process “Dira” intends to capture. In
accordance with Fitts’ law, we assume that the shorter observed
behavior represents mouse movements across elements moving
for a different target without cognitive processing of the image.
Consequently, element interactions below the identified 130ms
are excluded from further analysis.
4. RESULTS
We first report on the type of raw behavioral data collected
during the “quiz” and derived measures such as the chronology
of information acquisition. Secondly we present the self-reported
measures collected during the “rating” screen. We then show that
the number of interactions with elements relates to the reported
strength of the Eureka experience. Finally, we report results of
the length of different interactions in comparison to the reported
strength of reported Eureka experience. For the statistical tests
we adopted a critical α level of 0.01 as originally put forward
by Melton (1962) and Trafimow et al. (2018). For each test
where the estimated amount of false discoveries surpasses this
threshold, we transparently report this value as suggested by
Lakens et al. (2018). We adopt this practice for our study and the
chosen traditional threshold, in particular since the discussion on
statistical testing is far from over (Benjamin et al., 2017; Trafimow
et al., 2018).
4.1. Available Process-Tracing Measures
Participants’ interaction with elements on the “quiz” screen is
a metric for tracing their problem solving process. The time
to produce solutions has previously been used in convergent
thinking tasks (Salvi et al., 2016) and divergent thinking tasks
(Forthmann et al., 2017), a measure that is similar to the “quiz
time” in this paper. “Dira” employs a novel method by collecting
behavioral data, namely the interaction times with the stimuli,
throughout the creative process. This is a novel approach by
shifting the focus from measuring the duration to produce a
“creative product” to providing chronological measures of the
process itself. While the current paper focuses on the moment
solutions emerge, the experimental paradigm could be used to
trace other aspects of the creative process such as preparing
for the task or the verification of solutions. Since the extracted
behavioral measures are vital for understanding the subsequent
writing, we elaborate on the raw data and their derived measures
in this section.
To illustrate the kind of data collected in “Dira,” we will
now discuss in detail Figure 4. The duration of interaction with
each element is the difference between offset and onset time
which is the raw data recorded during the task. Figure 4 shows
the example of one participant’s interaction within the first
10 seconds of each of the 40 rounds. Each of the colored bars
represents a timespan during which the mouse pointer hovers
on top of an element. The length represents the duration, and
the color signifies with which element the participants interact.
For example, in the first round on the bottom of Figure 4, this
particular participant spent a long time on “image b” (for color
and naming scheme see Figure 1). The second round instead
starts with three short interactions with “image d,” “image e,”
and “image b” followed by a short time without any element
interaction before hovering on top of the “text” for almost two
seconds. Some rounds, like the third one, are finished within the
ten second period shown in Figure 4, others like the first two
continued for a more extended period.
Figure 4 also shows additional data that is available in “Dira.”
We refer to the moment participants select their solution as
the “quiz time” since it ends the current “quiz.” This measure
is similar to existing measures in other tasks, such as the total
time to solve convergent thinking tasks as reported by Salvi
et al. (2016) or to produce utterances for divergent thinking
tasks (Forthmann et al., 2017). The example participant selects
FIGURE 5 | Confidence, perceived task difficulty, and happiness related to the reported strength of the Eureka experience. The size of the circle represents the
number of rounds in which the combination was reported, larger circles representing more answers.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1773
Loesche et al. Paving the Way to Eureka
FIGURE 6 | Number of hovers before (Top row) and after (Bottom row) “First Full Scan” over the reported strength of Eureka experience.
the solution for round 3 at around 8,500ms and round 4 at
around 8,000ms. The selected solution, for example, “image c”
for round 3, is also indicated as a horizontal black line for the
rounds in Figure 4. The vertical black line marks the end of
what we call the “First Full Scan,” the end of the interaction
with the seventh unique element. Participants have interacted
with each element at least once at the end of the “First Full
Scan.” The number next to the vertical axis in Figure 4 represents
the strength of the Eureka moment participants indicate during
the “rating” screen. The example participant had no Eureka
experience in round 2 and 3, but a strong one in round 19 and 26.
Finally, the green box next to the vertical axis indicates rounds
that are part of the analysis and not filtered out for one of the
reasons explicated previously.
We administered “Dira” in three different conditions with
a between-subject design as introduced in section 3.1. Based
on the previously provided argument we hypothesized a longer
interaction time for conditions 2 and 3. To test this, we built two
linear mixed-effects models. Firstly we used the length of the First
Full Scan as a dependent variable with the participant and round
of the experiment as a random effect. We found no evidence for a
difference between the three conditions (χ2(2) = 2.4, p = 0.3).
In a second model, we used the quiz time as the dependent
variable as it is most similar to the task time used in other tasks
(Salvi et al., 2016; Forthmann et al., 2017). With participant and
round of the experiment as random effects, we found no evidence
that would support an effect of the experimental condition on
time to report a solution (χ2(2) = 0.87, p = 0.65). Without
support for the effect of the experimental conditions, there is no
argument to distinguish between the three conditions regarding
behavioral data.
4.2. Available Self-Reported Measures
Participants in the “Dira” task are required to provide self-
reported measures in addition to the implicit behavioral data
collected during the “quiz.” During the “reporting” screen they
are asked to account for the strength of their just encountered
Eureka experience, their confidence in the given solution, the
perceived difficulty of the task, and their current happiness on
seven-point Likert items respectively. Besides, participants in
condition 2 and 3 are also asked to rate how well they understand
the connection between the text and a potential solution. In
condition 3 they are furthermore asked to write down how their
solution is associated with the text. These measures are collected
during each of the 40 rounds. In section 3.1 we hypothesized
an increase in the reported Eureka experience for condition 3.
Nevertheless, this is not supported by the collected data (χ2(2) =
4.81, p = 0.09). Consequently, we cannot maintain a separate
analysis for the self-reports in the three conditions.
As illustrated in Figure 5, for rounds in which participants
report a strong Eureka experience they are also confident
regarding their solution. Rounds with weaker or no Eureka
experience are reported across the whole spectrum of confidence,
but with a tendency toward low confidence as well. Instead,
rounds with strong Eureka experiences are rarely rated as low
confidence. This asymmetry leads to an overall Spearman’s
rank correlation of ρ = 0.62, p < 0.01. In contrast, rounds
with strong reported Eurekas rank low in difficulty and rarely
as “hard to come up with a solution.” Rounds with a low
or no Eureka experience are perceived with varying difficulty.
The overall correlation between the reported Eureka experience
and stated task difficulty is ρ = −0.41, p < 0.01. Finally, for
weak or no perceived Eureka, participants express a range of
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FIGURE 7 | The ratio between the last hover time within the First Full Scan and the average of all other hover times in the “First Full Scan,” separated by rounds in
which participants hover over the chosen image last vs. the ones they look at another picture. A value of one means that they are equal, lower than one means the last
scan is shorter than the previous ones. In addition to the box-whisker plot (showing the median and distribution), the lines show a linear model fitted to the mean ratio
and surrounded by the 95% confidence interval in light gray.
different happiness, but only high happiness for strong Eureka
experiences. Reported Eureka and happiness are correlated by
ρ = 0.6, p < 0.01. The reliability of the rating is either good
for reported Eureka (α = 0.86) and difficulty (α = 0.87), or
acceptable for happiness (α = 0.78) and confidence (α = 0.77)
based on Cronbach’s alpha. Conceptually these four measures are
linked by the literature review of Topolinski and Reber (2010a),
who discuss the relationship between ease, positive affect, and
confidence to insight. This link is reflected by the data collected
in “Dira” with good reliability suggested by Cronbach’s α =
0.86 across the four measures. Consequently, these findings
confirm our second hypothesis that participants can report their
experience on more than a binary scale.
4.3. Number of Interactions
In this section, we take a first look at the relationship between
the self-reported intensity of the Eureka experience and the
chronology extracted from the behavioral data. For example,
when participants acquire information during the “quiz” and
they find a solution, they might stop looking at more images.
Therefore we hypothesize that the Eureka experience is stronger
for rounds with fewer interactions. Figure 6 shows how many
elements a participant interacts with during each of the 40 rounds
of the “Dira” experiment. The sub-figure on the top shows
the number of interactions during the “First Full Scan” before
participants have seen each element at least once. An average of
ten to twelve interactions means that participants tend to go back
and forth between elements even before they have seen all seven
elements. More specifically, if participants look at elements in a
certain order, looking back at one element and then continuing
with the round can result in two additional interactions. To
give an example: one participant has looked at “image a” and
“image b” and then goes back to “image a” before continuing with
“image b,” “image c,” and “image d.” In this case, the participant
had interacted twice with “image a” and “image b” during the
“First Full Scan.” This particular round would have accounted for
at least nine interactions before the end of the “First Full Scan.”
To arrive at the numbers shown in Figure 6, this seems to happen
twice in a typical “First Full Scan.”
To test the above hypothesis, we built an ordinal mixed-
effects model (Christensen, 2015) with reported Eureka as a
dependent variable. The number of interactions, the classification
into before and after “First Full Scan,” and the experimental
conditions were used as predictors. The rounds of the experiment
as well as participants were considered as random effects. Results
from this model indicate that there is a significant negative effect
(estimate = −0.06, z = −6.27, p < 0.01) of numbers of hovers
on the reported Eureka before the end of the “First Full Scan.”
The model also shows a significant negative effect (estimate =
−0.35, z = −3.68, p < 0.01) for the number of interactions after
the end of the “First Full Scan.” This confirms our hypothesis
for the interactions during and after the “First Full Scan.” On
the other hand, there is no evidence that condition 2 or 3 have
an effect compared to participants in condition 1 (estimates =
[−0.12, −0.28], z = [−0.35, −0.88], p = [0.73, 0.38]).
During the “First Full Scan,” the above model shows a
significant effect of the number of interactions with elements on
the strength of the Eureka experience. Across all conditions, this
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FIGURE 8 | The hover duration on the images within the First Full Scan. The time on the (C)hosen picture is longer the time on the five other images that are (N)ot
chosen.
difference is between 12.61 interactions for no or low Eureka
experiences and 11.38 interactions for strong reported Eurekas.
After the “First Full Scan” participants do not interact with all
the images and text, again. The significant effect of the number
of interactions on the reported strength of Eureka is higher
this time and more pronounced in Figure 6: the difference is
between 9.65 interactions for no experience of a Eureka and 4.24
interactions for a strong one. There is no evidence for an effect of
the experimental condition on these results. Considering that the
behavior of participants with different Eureka experiences seems
to change before the end of the “First Full Scan,” it is of interest to
examine the behavior during the “First Full Scan” in more detail.
Hereafter we will examine whether the duration of hovering over
elements provides additional information.
4.4. Last Hover During First Full Scan
Here we report the results for the hover duration on the seventh
unique element. It is the last image during the “First Full Scan”
and the first time participants interact with this specific element.
Following up on the previous finding of an interesting difference
between interactions during and after the “First Full Scan,” we
want to narrow down the time of emerging solutions by exploring
this specific hover time. More specifically we show the ratio
of the duration on the last image compared to the mean of
previous interactions. The chronometrical measure of hover time
is illustrated in Figure 7. To correct for individual differences in
processing speed, we plot the ratio of the hover time on the last
image and the average hover times on all other images during the
“First Full Scan.” Figure 7 plots separately the ratio of rounds in
which this element is the one (C)hosen later in the experiment
and rounds which end on a (N)on-chosen one.
Figure 7 shows two effects: Firstly, for the “First Full Scans”
ending on a chosen image, the median of the hover time is
roughly 50% higher on that element than for non-chosen ones
(1,323 vs. 855.9ms). Secondly, less time seems to be spent on
the last non-chosen image than on the previous ones for stronger
Eureka experiences, whereas more time is spent on the last image
for low Eureka values. To quantify these effects we built an
ordinal mixed-effect regression model with the strength of the
reported Eureka experience as a dependent variable and the ratio,
the type of element for the last hover, and the experimental
condition as predictors. The round of the experiment and the
participant were used as random effects. This model shows a
significant effect of the ratio on the strength of the reported
Eureka (estimate = −0.24, z = −6.1, p < 0.01). It further
shows a significant effect for rounds in which the last element
is the chosen one on the strength of the reported Eureka
(estimate = 0.2, z = 2.71, p < 0.01). There is no evidence
for the ratio in condition 2 or 3 affecting the reported Eureka
intensity (estimate = [−0.09,−0.55], z = [−0.32, −0.32], p =
[0.75, 0.05]).
The negative slope of the ratio over the strength of Eureka, in
Figure 7 particularly evident for the last hover on the non-chosen
image, suggests that a solution has emerged before the end of the
“First Full Scan.” The change of the ratio is either the result of
a decrease of the numerator, an increase of the denominator, or
a combination of both. The numerator decreases if participants
spent less time on the last image when having a stronger Eureka
experience. The denominator represents the average time spent
on all previous images. It increases if participants spend more
time on at least one of the previous images. If participants had
Eureka experiences while looking at the image they are going
to choose later, and this would be associated with them looking
longer at that image, this would increase the denominator in
the rounds which end on the non-chosen images. The observed
increase would also explain the difference between rounds that
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FIGURE 9 | The ratio of time spent on the chosen image over non-chosen images as a box-whisker plot with a linear model fit to the mean. The median for the ratio
depicted in the box-whisker plot shows that participants spend nearly 1.3 times as much time on the chosen image compared to the others for a low Eureka, but
about twice the time for a strong Eureka. The difference between mean (linear model) and median (box-whisker) results from outliers in the data.
end on chosen and non-chosen images. If participants spent
less time on subsequent images, for example after a Eureka
experience, this would decrease the numerator for the rounds
ending on non-chosen images, but not for the ones ending on the
chosen images. This interpretation of the observations suggests
that the measured ratio is a compound of chronological effects
and hover duration. Therefore we focus now on the duration
spent on the chosen image and its relation to the strength of
Eureka.
4.5. Chosen Images and Length of
Interactions
The observation of the ratio of interaction times during the “First
Full Scan” suggests that the interaction times between chosen
and non-chosen images differ. Instead of a compound measure,
we purely show the duration of hover times during the “First
Full Scan” on (C)hosen and (N)on-chosen images in Figure 8. A
Mann-Whitney test indicates that the duration of viewing chosen
images (duration = 935.9ms) is significantly longer than for
non-chosen pictures (duration= 687.8ms), U = 20,873,370, p
< 0.01). Furthermore, there is a significant difference between
the three conditions regarding the hover duration on non-
chosen images (H = 42.07), p < 0.01 MdCondition 1 = 663.2,
MdCondition 2 = 679.7, MdCondition 3 = 727.9), according to
a Kruskal-Wallis test. Furthermore, there is a difference
between conditions for the chosen images (H= 9.18, p =
0.01,MdCondition 1= 879.8,MdCondition 2= 915.9,MdCondition 3 =
1,048). Participants spend a significantly longer time on the
chosen image in the third condition than in the other two
conditions, and more time in the second condition compared to
the first one.
We now look at the link between hover duration and reported
Eureka experience in more detail. We built an ordinal regression
model with the reported strength of the Eureka experience
as the dependent variable. With the hovering time on the
chosen images as a predictor, we failed to find evidence for a
link between the strength of the Eureka and interaction time
(estimate = 0.01, z = 0.21, p = 0.83). This is not unexpected
since the raw data include slower and faster participants. Instead,
if an ordinal mixed-effects model considers the participant as
a random effect, the evidence supporting the link between
hover duration and Eureka experience surpasses the threshold
(estimate = 0.14, z = 3.16, p < 0.01). From this example we
conclude that the recorded raw hover durations with text and
images have little validity in connection with the self-reported
measures collected during the “rating” screen. To address this, we
remove the influence of participants and the task by considering
the ratio between the time spent on chosen and non-chosen
images calculated separately for each round. This suggested
ratio between interaction times for a single round and with a
single participant does not include chronological components
related to the order of interactions; it is between measured times
only.
Figure 9 shows the ratio between the hover duration on the
chosen image and the average time spent on the other images.
This ratio is higher for rounds in which participants report
a stronger Eureka experience. An ordinal mixed-effects model
fitted to the data supports this observation. The model uses
the strength of the reported Eureka experience as a dependent
variable and the ratio between the time spent on the selected
image compared to the average duration on all other images as
well as the experimental condition as a predictor. The round of
the “Dira” task and the participant are used as random variables.
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This model confirms that an increase in the ratio corresponds to
a stronger Eureka experience (estimate = 0.02, z = 5.65, p <
0.01). With a ratio of 1.3 for no Eureka and 2 for a strong Eureka,
participants seem to spend approximately 50% more time on
the chosen image in rounds when they report a strong Eureka
experience. However, the model does not provide evidence for an
influence of condition 2 or 3 on the reported Eureka (estimates =
[−0.1,−0.58], z = [−0.33, −2], p = [0.74, 0.05]).
Here we have presented two main findings. Firstly, the
observations of the length of interaction with elements show
that participants spend more time on the images they will select
later in the task. Secondly, for rounds with a strong reported
Eureka experience, the time spent on the chosen image is
significantly longer than in rounds with a weaker or no Eureka
experience.
5. DISCUSSION
The moment when a solution to a problem emerges is
an extraordinary experience. It causes people to cry out
“Eureka” (Pollio, 1914), “Aha” (Bühler, 1908), or “Uh-oh” (Hill
and Kemp, 2016) and often their mood increases. In this
paper, we suggest “Dira” as a novel experimental paradigm to
observe these moments as part of the creative process. Many
previous studies rely on the judgement of creative products,
persons, or press (Rhodes, 1961)—or use proxy phenomena
to assess the process contributing to creativity, innovation,
and problem solving. In this study, we tested 124 people who
participated in a controlled lab experiment designed to study the
emergence of solutions. “Dira” records behavioral data during
each task to observe the creative process directly. Specifically,
we determine the chronology and chronometric measures of
participants’ interaction with potential solutions. After each
task, we ask the participants to self-report their experience
on four different items. Here we discuss the implications of
combined behavioral and metacognitive measures in the “Dira”
task.
5.1. Eureka Experiences in “Dira”
Results from the behavioral data within the “First Full Scan”
of “Dira” show that participants spend longer times on images
they are going to select as their solution. Moreover, the length
of the interaction on these chosen images is linked to the
strength of the reported Eureka experience, with longer hover
durations associated with stronger Eureka experiences. As shown
in section 4.4, the median interaction time on the chosen image
is about 50% longer than on the non-chosen ones. Another result
related to the strength of Eureka is reported in section 4.5. For
rounds that evoke a strong Eureka experience, participants spend
about 50%more time hovering on the chosen image as compared
to rounds with no or low reported Eurekas. The current analysis
does not allow drawing any conclusions regarding causality.
Future studies could test if more extended engagement yields
stronger Eureka experiences or if stronger Eureka experiences
lead to longer hover durations.
After participants have interacted with the chosen image,
they are less likely to continue looking for more elements
according to the results in section 4.3. Supposedly participants
continuously scan the elements on the screen for a solution. If
they find an association, the number of elements they interact
with afterwards is related to the strength of the Eureka experience
reported later. The significant effect can be observed as early as
during the “First Full Scan” and the initial interaction with the
images. These results suggest that something distinctive might
already be happening during the initial engagement with the
images.
With support from the ordinal mixed-effects model
considering behavioral and self-reported measures, we confirm
our first hypothesis that behavior happening during the “quiz”
results in the reported intensity of Eureka. It would seem
natural that the Eureka experience also happens during this
time. However, it is not impossible that the Eureka experience
is the result of a post-event evaluation. In any case, due to the
short quiz time, these experiences would qualify as immediate
insights according to Cranford andMoss (2012). In their study of
convergent thinking, they found a difference between solutions
found through a “classical insight” sequence and “immediate
insights.” The immediate insights only consisted of an “Aha!”
or Eureka experience and were considerably faster. This quick
insight is also in line with the idea of intrapersonal creativity or
mini-c introduced by Beghetto and Kaufman (2007). It would
be interesting to design a modified version of “Dira” to elicit
non-immediate insights as well, for example by tapping into the
thought suppression as used in the delayed incubation paradigm
(Gilhooly et al., 2014) or more generally in “little-c” type of tasks.
We leave this speculation for future studies.
5.2. Subjective Experience
In more detail, the strong Eureka experience in rounds with high
confidence is consistent with previous findings, for example by
Hedne et al. (2016). In their study on magic tricks, problems
solved via insight were rated with higher confidence than
problems solved without insight. Previously Danek et al. (2014)
had assessed a higher confidence rating for insight solutions
as well, but they had used confidence in the definition of
insight given to the participants, so this could have been a
potential confound in their results. Hedne et al. (2016) also
explicitly link confidence with the correctness of the solution,
and Steele et al. (2018) highlight that confidence predicts a
creative outcome. Further support comes from Topolinski and
Reber (2010b) and Salvi et al. (2016) who identified a higher
probability to be correct for insight solutions in convergent
thinking tasks.
Happiness and, more generally, a positive mood is strongly
linked to insights and Eureka experiences in the existing
literature. In the “Dira” task participants experiencing a strong
Eureka seldom report low happiness, but instead are consistently
happier than with weaker or no Eureka experiences. The
meta-review of Baas et al. (2008) provides a comprehensive
overview of the relationship between mood and insight. More
recently Shen et al. (2015) explore 98 different emotional
states and their relationship to “Aha!” experiences. Results
from their studies 2 and 3 suggest a link between insight and
happiness—along with a list of other positive emotional states.
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The mapping of states in two dimensions affords that other
emotions could mask happiness for weaker Eureka experiences.
While Abdel-Khalek (2006) finds single-item measurements
of happiness sufficient to assess related positive affects and
emotions, the fine-grained exploration of the emotional space
associated with emerging solutions could be a topic for future
research.
Our results for the relationship between difficulty and Eureka
show that “Dira” tasks with a strong Eureka experience are
rarely perceived as difficult. This finding seems counter-intuitive
from the perspective of the classical “insight sequence” (Ohlsson,
1992) in which a complicated impasse has to be navigated.
However, perceived difficulty can change in hindsight. Even
if the task appears to be problematic while working on it,
Topolinski and Reber (2010a) have shown that having an
insight can change this. In a review of the literature, they
identify a change of processing fluency as a result of having
an insight. After having found the solution, they conclude, the
problem appears to be easier than it was during the attempt
to solve it. Alternatively, yet another interpretation is that the
participants experience insights in tasks that are not difficult for
them.
5.3. Differences Between Conditions and
Personalities
In section 3.1 we provide a theoretical argument for
administering “Dira” in the three different conditions. In
particular, we hypothesized providing a potential solution would
result in an increased interaction time. The collected data do
not support this hypothesis as the results in section 4.1 show.
We had further assumed that the additional task of elaborating
on the chosen solution would increase the interaction time
and change the self-report. As section 4.2 demonstrates,
the data do not provide evidence for this effect. This could
either mean that the theoretical argument is not sound and
additional variables would influence the measurements to an
extent that masks the hypothesized effect. Furthermore, the
introduced interventions might tap into different effects than
expected. Assuming that the theoretical argument is valid,
the effect size could be too small or “Dira” as an instrument
not sensitive enough to measure the effect within the sample.
In summary, there is no evidence that supports a difference
between the behavioral or self-reported measures among the
three conditions.
In a trial-by-trial comparison, we reveal a link between fewer
interactions and stronger Eureka experiences. In section 4.3
we compare the differences in the number of interactions
observed between Eureka intensities, separately during and
after the “First Full Scan.” We observe a significantly larger
variance between no and strong Eureka experiences after the
“First Full Scan.” This difference implies that the experience is
influenced by element interactions and not by the participants’
distinctive approach to the task. On the other hand, individual
variability might moderate the experience and performance in
the “Dira” experiment. Future research could expand the method
we suggest to address the relationship with personality traits.
Specifically, “Dira” could be used to test if traits known to
correlate with creative production (Batey et al., 2010) predict
eureka experiences.
5.4. Experimental Control
The participants’ freedom to choose the order and duration of
stimulus interaction is supposed to increase task engagement, but
it does not come without costs. The flexibility to look at elements
in any order allows participants in the “Dira” experiment to not
look at elements necessary to solve the problem. For example,
some participants choose not to look at the text before selecting
one of the images. Furthermore, participants who start with the
text and try to find a matching image afterwards might use a
different approach to solve the problem than others who engage
with images first and interact with the text later during the task.
In the first case, they only need to store the text itself or a derived
concept in working memory to match it against each of the
images they look at. In the second case instead, they need to
remember up to six images and related concepts to match each
of them with the text. In the current study, we filtered for rounds
in which participants started with the text and removed all others.
Future studies could eliminate the second case by specifying the
chronology, for example by showing the text first.
As discussed earlier, the bimodal distribution of hover
durations suggests that participants unblur elements for at least
two different reasons. As discussed in section 3.5, participants
might either intend to move the mouse pointer across by
targeting elements on the other side or consciously engage
with the text and images. In the current study, we assumed
interactions shorter than 130ms to represent mouse movement
across elements. While these interactions were removed post-
hoc from the current study, avoiding short unblurring could be
implemented in the experimental design. The elements could
only be shown clearly if the hover time exceeds the movement
time predicted by Fitts’ law (Soukoreff and MacKenzie, 2004).
6. CONCLUSION
In the “Dira” task, we estimate the moment of the emerging
solution based on the participants’ behavior and self-reports
without relying on additional indicators. Like inmany design and
engineering problems, more than one solution is correct for this
task. For “Dira” we demonstrate how behavioral data and meta-
cognitive monitoring are integrated by this instrument to identify
sub-processes of the creative process.
The results suggest that participants can distinguish between
Eureka experiences of different strengths. Thus, our results
suggest that Eureka experiences are not limited to having or not
having an insight, but that the perception of this experience can
have different intensity levels. Future studies should keep this in
mind when assessing Eureka experiences.
Looking at the whole process of finding a solution to an
ill-defined problem, people experience something early in the
problem solving process that they relate to the Eureka experience.
While the exact timing remains unclear, observations in “Dira”
help narrowing down insight and other sub-processes. For
example, before seeing all the elements in the “Dira” task,
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participants in our study exhibit distinctive behavior related to
the strength of their reported Eureka experience. Our results
suggest that immediate insights exist and can be reported by
people who experience them.
The creative process is often studied indirectly through
the creative product, person, or press. We propose “Dira”
as an experimental platform to record behavior as Eureka
experiences are happening. This instrument and future
studies applying the same underlying principle can bring
us another step closer to understanding the creative
process.
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